The “China card” has long been played by U.S. politicians for political and electoral gains, especially during election seasons. However, this election cycle has seen little use of the “China card” in the presidential debates.
The scholarship suggests that two conditions typically prompt the use of China as a political tool in U.S. elections. First, the sitting president must face significant setbacks in China-U.S. relations. Second, the opposition party needs to perceive a domestic political advantage in criticizing the president’s China policy as weak leadership. With neither condition applying this election cycle, China has not emerged as a key issue.
History provides several examples of how the party out of power has leveraged perceived failures in China-U.S. relations to put the sitting president on the defensive. In the wake of World War II, a full-scaled civil war resumed between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party. After the Harry Truman administration’s unsuccessful attempt to mediate the conflict and form a coalition government, it ultimately decided that no amount of U.S. aid could save Chiang’s regime and a CCP victory would not be as detrimental to U.S. interests as initially feared.
Republicans capitalized on the widespread anti-communist sentiment in the United States to attack Truman and the Democrats for the “loss” of China to communism. In an effort to preempt criticism, Truman issued a White Paper explaining the administration’s China strategy before Chiang’s retreat to Taiwan. At the same time, the White House swiftly distanced itself from any discussion of recognizing Mao’s regime after China fell. However, this stance could not erase the fact that China had fallen under Truman’s watch. While the China issue alone does not fully explain the Republican resurgence in the 1950 election, there is little doubt that Republican opposition to Truman’s China policies played a key role in their electoral resurgence.
While Democrats typically focus on domestic issues like healthcare and education during election cycles, they have also played the “China card” when the opportunity arises. President George H. W. Bush’s tepid public response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown left him out of touch with the views of many Americans, who disapproved of his handling of China. In addition, Bush’s efforts to privately reassure Chinese leaders were later seen as weak and unprincipled.
Sensing an opportunity, Democrats sought to use China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status as a political wedge to divide Republicans. MFN status allowed China to trade with the United States on the same terms as most other countries, without being subject to high tariffs. After the Tiananmen crackdown, Bush announced his intention to extend China’s MFN status, but Democrats repeatedly proposed bills conditioning the extension on China’s human rights record. While pro-business Republicans sided with Bush due to their economic interests in China, socially conservative Republicans aligned with liberal Democrats. Ultimately, Democrats succeeded in making MFN status a prominent issue in the 1992 presidential election, which Bill Clinton exploited to condemn Bush for appeasing Beijing.
The “China card” has historically been a reliable tool for electoral gains, even in recent elections like those in 2016 and 2020. However, China was notably absent from both the Trump-Biden and Trump-Harris debates. Why has the “China card” seemingly been discarded this time?
To answer this, we must revisit the two conditions required for the effective use of the “China card.” First, the sitting president, Joe Biden, has not experienced major setbacks in handling China-U.S. relations. As a foreign policy veteran, Biden’s decades of experience in foreign affairs have enabled him to balance the interests of both domestic and international audiences in his China policy. Domestically, he retained former President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports and steadily escalated measures against Beijing’s tech development in the name of protecting U.S. interests, without provoking significant backlash. These actions have made it difficult for his political rivals to portray him as soft on China.
Biden has strengthened U.S. partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese military presence and aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait – efforts he has consistently pushed forward, even toward the end of his presidency. Meanwhile, he pursued active engagement with China, shifting from the “decoupling” rhetoric of the Trump era to a “de-risking” approach. This strategy reassured U.S. allies of U.S. leadership in Asia despite China’s growing assertiveness, while also demonstrating Washington’s flexibility in negotiating with major powers like China to maintain regional stability.
In other words, Biden has not made any major missteps in handling China that the GOP could exploit. Criticizing him on China is unlikely to yield significant electoral gains, especially since many China-related bills he signed into law were framed as bipartisan, even if partisan interests were at play behind the scenes. While Republicans can still attack Biden for the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan or the prolonged Israel-Hamas conflict, these issues are difficult to tie to China-U.S. relations given China’s geographic distance from the Middle East.
More importantly, Biden, as the sitting president, is not running for reelection. This gives the Democratic candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, a clean slate in foreign policy, allowing her to selectively inherit Biden’s political legacy. No matter what foreign policy criticisms are directed at Harris, she can align herself with Biden’s successes (e.g., managing China) while distancing herself from his setbacks (e.g., the Middle East conflicts). For this reason, Republicans understand that playing the “China card” is not a particularly effective strategy against the Democrats this time around.
Second, the 2024 presidential election is almost a continuation of the 2022 midterm elections, where foreign conflicts are overshadowed by domestic issues. Much of the focus has been on the economy, U.S. democracy, and abortion rights, driven by a series of highly controversial domestic events such as Trump’s indictments, the overturning of Roe v. Wade, and ongoing inflation. In this context, foreign affairs have naturally taken a backseat to domestic concerns for most Americans.
Although the 118th Congress has introduced more China-related bills than in previous sessions, lawmakers have had to frame them increasingly in terms of domestic issues. Even bills centered around national security narratives, like the TikTok ban, are receiving less public attention.
In the meantime, China has been softening its once aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy over the past two years, making efforts to repair relations with the United States. A recent example is the Chinese government’s release of an American pastor who had been in prison since 2006. This more cooperative posture has further reduced the salience of China as an electoral issue, making it almost politically futile to play the “China card” for both Democrats and Republicans.
While the usual back-and-forth over who is softer on China will likely persist in the lead up to the final election, substantive debate on China is expected to be limited unless something major occurs. Trump wants to maintain his isolationist stance on China without alienating hawkish conservatives, while Harris aims to show strong leadership in managing China without closing off opportunities to chart a new course for China-U.S. relations.
For both candidates, the optimal time to play the “China card” is likely not during this election cycle, but afterward, when the winner begins to craft a policy vision.
