The intense military confrontation between Iran and Israel, sparked by the assassination of key Hezbollah and Hamas leaders and followed by Tehran’s large-scale missile strikes on Tel Aviv, has led to a notable increase in anti-Shia and anti-Jewish propaganda efforts by the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP).

ISKP’s Uzbek and Tajik wings are exploiting the Iranian-Israeli military escalation to recruit, raise funds, and incite violence. Amid Israel’s devastating war with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” forces, the Islamic States’ Khorasan branch has launched a propaganda offensive targeting both Iran and Israel, branding them as “enemies of the Islamic Ummah, equally dangerous to the Ahlus Sunnah (Sunni Islam).”

Shortly after Hamas’ October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks and the subsequent destructive Israeli invasion of Gaza, ISKP’s official multilingual propaganda arm, Al-Azaim Media Foundation, initiated a media campaign targeting Iran and Israel through its English-language magazine, Voice of Khurasan (Issue 35), under the headline “Sibling Quarrel.” The editorial expressed satisfaction, noting how two sworn enemies of Islam were destroying each other in the Middle East.

The article spins an elaborate conspiracy theory, contending that despite the depiction of the Iran-Israel conflict, Shias are historically descended from Jewish Sabaeans, and both groups actively undermine the Islamic Ummah by opposing the true faith of Allah. It further claims that the “enmity” between Iran and Israel is a contrived narrative, sustained by “orchestrated, mutually coordinated missile strikes” intended to foster the illusion of a protracted conflict. Additionally, it argues that Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” has done nothing to advance the freedom of Palestinian Muslims but has instead corrupted both their religion and society.

ISKP’s propaganda asserts that Israel aims to establish a Jewish state from the Nile to the Euphrates, while Iran aspires to form a Shia crescent extending from Tripoli to Mecca, unified in its hostility toward Sunni Muslims. The publication further insists that only the Islamic State can thwart the dangerous schemes of both Israel and Iran, purging the Middle East of Jews and Shias.

Following the publication of Voice of Khurasan, the Tajik and Uzbek media wings of ISKP’s Al-Azaim Media Foundation, specifically al-Azaim Tajiki and al-Azaim Uzbeki, initiated a propaganda campaign directed against both Iran and Israel. A pro-IS Tajik Telegram channel, Sadoi Khuroson, stated that “Rawafidhs [a derogatory term for Shia Muslims] are the donkeys of the Jews,” employing profoundly offensive language.

Weaponizing Sectarian Hatred: ISKP’s Anti-Shia and Anti-Semitic Ideology

Notably, ISKP propaganda frequently targets both Shias and Jews simultaneously, reflecting the group’s broader ideological goals. Violent anti-Shiism and antisemitism are core principles of the hardline Salafi ideology embraced by the Uzbek and Tajik wings of ISKP.

Before the emergence of ISKP in Afghanistan in late 2014, al-Qaida-linked Central Asian jihadi organizations espoused a less severe form of anti-Shia and antisemitic ideology and did not perceive Iran and Israel in a unified context. But over the past decade, local ISKP ideologues have effectively transformed their Central Asian militants, Tajiks in particular – who share deep cultural, linguistic, and historical ties with the Persians of Iran – into fervent anti-Shia and anti-Jewish Salafi jihadists. Today, vitriolic rhetoric against Jews and Shia Muslims dominates publications such as Xuroson Ovozi, Sadoi Khuroson, and Khurasan Ghag magazines, as well as the al-Azaim Tajiki and al-Azaim Uzbeki Telegram channels. 

Despite the apparent enmity between Iran and Israel, the Uzbek and Tajik wings of ISKP nevertheless perceive Jews and Shias as allies. Their anti-Shiism is deeply intertwined with the group’s antisemitism within the framework of Central Asian Salafism. After October 7 conspiracy theories have gained traction within Central Asian Salafi circles accusing Shias of acting as agents of the Jews in a coordinated effort to undermine Sunni Islam. 

In addition to its goal of liberating the sacred lands of Bayt ul Maqdis (Jerusalem) and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, one of Islam’s three holiest sites, anti-Shia and anti-Semitic ideology has now become a core element of ISKP Tajik and Uzbek unit’s media strategy.

In line with directives from its parent organization, pro-ISKP Telegram channels in Cyrillic, operated by Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik jihadi propagandists, often claim that “the Jews and the Rawafidh are two sides of the same coin.” These platforms exploit the global Jewish-Shia conspiracy narrative to boost recruitment, fundraise, incite violence, and expand ISKP’s ideological reach throughout the post-Soviet Central Asian region.

Anti-Shia Doctrine Propelled Tajik ISKP to Strike Iran

Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, ISKP’s hardline anti-Shia and antisemitic ideology has undeniably played a pivotal role in expanding its propaganda reach and internationalizing its operational agenda. The group has relentlessly criticized the Taliban – its chief adversary – accusing them of deviating from religious purity, colluding with Shia Iran, and aligning with U.S. interests, thereby reinforcing its narrative as the sole legitimate defender of the faith of Allah.

Over the past three years, ISKP has evolved from a provincial branch of the Islamic State, focused primarily on fighting the local Taliban regime, into one of the world’s most notorious and dangerous terrorist organizations. This shift toward regionalization and internationalization has been propelled largely by post-Soviet Tajik and Uzbek militants, who orchestrated high-profile attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia between 2022 and 2024.

Since 2021, ISKP has successfully formed a Shaheed (martyrdom) unit comprised of Tajik fighters, specifically tasked with targeting Iranian Shias. These militants are celebrated as exemplars of bravery, devotion, and self-sacrifice in the quest for the Islamic Caliphate. Driven by a potent blend of anti-Shiism and antisemitic ideology, ISKP’s Tajik fighters have elevated the group’s external operations to new global heights, significantly broadening its transnational reach and influence.

The first external operation conducted by ISKP’s Tajik wing – extending beyond its traditional areas of operation in Central Asia and Afghanistan – took place on October 26, 2022, in Iran’s southwestern Fars province. In this attack, a Tajik militant opened fire at the Shah Cheragh shrine in Shiraz, resulting in at least 15 fatalities and over 40 injuries. Shortly after, ISKP claimed responsibility through its Amaq News Agency, stating that the purpose of the attack was to “remind the Rawafidh that the companions of the Prophet Muhammad have descendants who inherit revenge generation after generation.” Amaq also referenced its 2018 attack during a military parade in Ahvaz Province as further evidence of its continued commitment to avenging the Shia. 

A few days later, Islamic State’s Al-Naba (#363) published a photo and video of a Tajik fighter, codenamed Abu Aisha al-Omari, holding a rifle in front of an Islamic State flag, pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence identified the shooter as Subhan Kamroni, also known by his alias as Abu Aisha, a citizen of Tajikistan. The ministry further reported the arrest of 26 Islamic State Takfiri militants, all foreign nationals from Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan. 

The second high-profile external operation by ISKP’s Tajik wing, which garnered significant international attention and caused extensive casualties, occurred on January 3, 2024. A twin bombing targeted a gathering of Iranians commemorating former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, at his grave in Kerman, Iran. The devastating attack claimed 96 lives and injured 284 others. The Islamic State, through its Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility, releasing a video of two Tajik fighters pledging allegiance to Islamic State leader Sheikh Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi before carrying out the operation.

Following the attack, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, through the state-run Tasnim News agency, identified the two ISKP Tajik suicide bombers as Abdollah al-Tajiki and Israeli Bazirov, a 24-year-old Tajikistani citizen. The ministry disclosed that Bazirov, who had undergone jihadi training at an ISKP camp in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, had illegally entered Iran through a smuggler’s route in the Sistan and Baluchistan province.

ISKP’s Tajik wing attracted further international attention following its highly coordinated attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow on March 22, 2024. Executed by four Tajik militants, this operation marked the wing’s third and most significant external attack to date.

The appeal of ISKP for Tajik and Uzbek recruits lies in its compelling ideological doctrine and sophisticated propaganda strategy, which have successfully targeted the most vulnerable and disillusioned segments of Central Asian society, often unemployed and impoverished youth. In their desperation, many find solace and direction in radical Salafism.

Amid Israel’s devastating military campaigns in Gaza and southern Lebanon, which have resulted in significant civilian casualties, ISKP’s multilingual Al-Azaim Media Foundation continues to amplify and weaponize its hardline anti-Shia and anti-Jewish ideology for strategic gain. Voice of Khorasan, Al-Naba, and pro-ISKP Tajik, Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek Telegram channels are all filled with sectarian hostility and inflammatory dawahs from prominent Salafi imams, targeting both Israel and Iran under a unified ideological framework.

The headlines from ISKP’s Voice of Khorasan articles, such as “Message to Our Brothers and Sisters in Palestine: Join the Caravan of Izzah” (issue #33), “Why IS Mujahideen Target Rawafidh and Turn Their Cities into Cemeteries” (issue #38), “Sufyani’s Army is Gathering” (issue #38), “Palestine: The New War on Tyrants Has Begun” (issue #32), and “Reality of Rawafidh” (issue #32), along with their Dari-language book “The Rawafidh and Bait al-Maqdis,” reveal the group’s strategic exploitation of the Israel-Hezbollah-Hamas conflict to advance its jihadi goals. These publications blend anti-Shia and antisemitic ideologies, promoting conspiracy theories that depict Shia Muslims as long-standing allies of Jews in a unified campaign to annihilate Sunni Islam.

ISKP: A Terrorism Threat to the West

ISKP’s sophisticated anti-Shia and antisemitic ideology is strategically crafted to expand the scale of both local and global attacks, while also inciting lone-wolf terrorists in Europe and the United States to commit high-profile acts of violence. The recent arrests of ISKP sympathizers – including a Tajik national in Italy and Uzbek and Tajik migrants in Russia, Germany, and Turkey – underscore the influence of its calls for attacks against the “Crusaders,” Jews, and Shias.

ISKP Tajik and Uzbek wings’ ability to exploit the suffering in Gaza raises the real possibility that Central Asian migrants in the West could become radicalized by its ideological messaging. The prominence of the Palestinian conflict further amplifies the risk of lone-wolf attacks inspired by ISKP. This makes vigilance by Western counterterrorism and intelligence agencies critical.

“Although I began praying in sixth grade, it wasn’t until 2020 that I started wearing hijab,” Malika, a 20-year-old university student from Fergana who asked not to use her real name, told The Diplomat. “This led to unexpected pressure from my school community as everyone, including the teachers I was close with, began telling me to take my hijab off.”

“Once the school principal confronted me in front of everyone, harshly insisting that I stop wearing hijab and accused me of using it as a form of self-advertisement.”

To Malika’s relief, the nationwide COVID-19 lockdown mandated that everyone stay at home, allowing her to graduate in peace.

Central Asia’s war on hijab has persisted for years, and Malika’s story echoes the experiences shared by countless women who face similar struggles across the region. In our previous work for The Beet, we unpacked the political dynamics of the hijab ban in Central Asia, tracing its historical roots and policy implications. Now, we turn our attention to the real-world consequences on women’s lives, delving into the costs of state-imposed restrictions on religious expression.

As the region has aggressively promoted a secular, traditional dress code, Muslim  women have become the unintended victims of new regulations. Control over their attire is enforced largely through educational institutions, where young women study and work. 

“Banning or restricting hijab in the countries of the region falls within the overall framework of combating ‘wrong’ Islam as a central narrative in countering so-called religious extremism,” said Anastassiya Reshetnyak, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) consultant and a research fellow at Paperlab Research Center, in an interview with The Diplomat.

“In Kazakhstan, for example, women who wear the hijab are prevented from entering the civil service, and girls [wearing hijab] are prevented from attending school. Negative attitudes towards the wearing of the hijab are spread in society (including by civil servants), which leads to the alienation and disconnection of women and girls from the wider society and even at the community level.”

Astana’s decision to ban hijab for both students and teachers last year, in the name of preserving secular values, sparked intense debate. Despite Kazakhstan’s secular identity, around 70 percent of its population profess Islam. For girls from committed religious families, the alternative to conforming is often to remain uneducated.

The hijab ban “can contribute to the radicalization of both women and their communities,” Reshetnyak continued. “Restrictions on certain types of work can lead to ‘gray’ and ‘black’ employment – in fact, to even greater alienation from the state and society, and to closure from their community. The same applies to the prohibition of hijab in schools: girls are either transferred to homeschooling and lose contact with their peers and ‘secular’ teachers, or they drop out of school; alternatively, they go to countries where they can attend classes in hijab (e.g. Turkey).”

On July 26, the Council of Ulema of Tajikistan issued a fatwa, a legal ruling on a point of Islamic law, advising women against wearing “tight, black or see-through clothing.” Noting that the black color is not mandated by the Hanafi Islamic legal framework, the fatwa marked that “traditional national clothing of Tajik mothers and sisters, consisting of a scarf, dress, and trousers, fully meets the requirements” of the Islamic school of jurisprudence followed by majority of Muslims in the country. 

Although the fatwa does not specify what is meant by “black clothing,” it is likely referring to black abayas, traditionally worn in Arab Muslim societies. These garments gained prominence in Central Asia only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as people sought to reconnect with their Islamic heritage. The influx of religious literature, scholars, and missionaries from the Middle East, as well as the exposure of Central Asians to global Islamic practices through travel and social media platforms, contributed to the growing popularity of black abayas among women. However, Central Asian governments often view them as a foreign influence and a potential symbol of political or radical Islam.

Ironically, such restrictions on religious attire bolstered the recruitment tactics of extremist groups in Central Asia. The connection “was particularly evident in [Islamic State] recruitment, when secular authorities in the region were branded as kafirs (infidels), including for their stance on the appearance of believers. At various points, not only hijabs but also, for example, men’s beards were criticized and banned,” explained Resehtnyak. 

For men, adhering to Islamic dress requirements is relatively straightforward, as their awrah (nakedness), the part of the body that must be covered, is generally limited to the area between the navel and the knees. In contrast, women’s hijab covers them from head to toe, typically allowing only the face, hands, and feet to remain visible. This disparity means men encounter fewer social or practical barriers in maintaining religious dress while navigating everyday life.

“Recruiters [for extremist groups] appealed to the fact that believers in these countries could not properly practice their religion and remain faithful Muslims under severe restrictions,” Resehtnyak said. “This argument persists in one form or another to this day – for example, it is used in Taliban propaganda to create a positive image of Afghanistan under their control.”

The Council of Ulema’s fatwa was published a month after Dushanbe had passed a law banning the “import, sale, promotion, and use of clothing alien to the national culture,” essentially outlawing hijab. This ban is just another step taken by Dushanbe to control women’s attire. Back in 2007, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Education issued a directive banning both the hijab and miniskirts for school and university students. A decade later, in 2018, the Ministry of Culture extended this approach by promoting long skirts not only for university students but for all women. Their “Recommendations for Wearing Clothes in Tajikistan” advised against miniskirts, translucent dresses, deep necklines, crop tops, black clothing, and black scarves, indirectly targeting black Islamic full-coverage attire. 

At the time, local experts criticized the guidelines as another attempt by the authorities to suppress the wearing of hijabs and satr, a traditional headscarf.

In the heated debate over the hijab, both supporters and opponents often overlook a crucial point – each individual woman’s right to choose what she wears – leaving women’s voices sidelined in the very issue that most affects them.

Uzbekistan lifted its de facto ban on hijab for students in 2021, but with a condition: the head covering should either be a ro’mol, a national headscarf tied behind the neck, or a do’ppi, a national cap. “Taking into account the appeals of many parents and our national values, as an exception for our girls, it is allowed to wear a national headscarf (wrapped on the back of the head) and a do’ppi in school in white and light colors” said Uzbekistan’s Minister of Public Education Sherzod Shermatov. 

“I am currently married and a senior student at a university in Tashkent,” Malika recounted. “To qualify for graduation, I have to undergo an internship at a public school. A friend of mine and I were about to sign a contract with one school when the principal told us it is only possible if we take off our hijab or tie it behind. After that, we went to six more schools and received the same answer.”

Tashkent also abolished the administrative liability for wearing “prayer clothes” in public places in 2021 when revising the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.” The ban was lifted due to the absence of a clear legal definition of “prayer clothes.” Although Article 184.1 of the Administrative Code, which imposed penalties for wearing such attire except for religious officials, was rendered ineffective immediately, it took another two years for the provision to be formally removed.

However, covering one’s face in public places to the extent that it hinders identification is still banned (Article 184.4). Exceptions are made for wearing helmets, medical masks, and similar gear deemed necessary. Non-compliance with this provision results in a fine ranging from $250 to $400.

The law on measures to provide students of state general secondary education institutions with a modern school uniform from August 15, 2018 sets a certain norm for outfits, obligating that students “must walk inside the building of the educational institution without headgear.” This is explained by the “secular character of the general secondary education,” so wearing “elements that reflect belonging to different religions and denominations, as well as different subcultures (hijab, kipa, kashaya, cross etc.)” are not allowed.

“In the beginning of this school year, girls with hijabs were gathered and forced to remove their [hijab],” Said, whose sister is a senior student at general secondary school No. 32 of Namangan district, Namangan, told The Diplomat. Fearing for his sister’s safety, he asked The Diplomat not to disclose their identities. “The principal told them that they can not study at this school otherwise and they should transfer. Now she wears her scarf tied on the back of her head.”

Religious leaders of Central Asia do their best to appease the secular government while also commanding ordinary Muslims to follow Shariah, or Islamic law. Traditional Central Asian attire for women – headscarves, long dresses, and trousers adorned with vibrant colors and patterns – can meet Shariah requirements. However, governments mandating a specific clothing style as part of a broader effort to enforce a national identity strips pious women of their right to choose and undermines their bodily autonomy.

“Restricting freedoms is one of the worst tactics in the long-term prevention of violent extremism,” insisted Reshetnyak. “The logic of proponents of the hijab ban is to homogenize society by removing the manifestation and representation of ‘alien’ cultural traits related to the practice of Islam. However, it has long been proven that there is no direct correlation between religious knowledge and joining violent extremist organizations.”

“At the same time, one of the key characteristics of violent manifestations in Central Asia is a strong focus on the state and its institutions (especially the security forces). A common characteristic of those who join violent extremist organizations is a sense of injustice and lack of inclusion in public processes,” Reshetnyak continued. In order to address that root cause, “it is necessary, on the contrary, to create conditions that ensure the inclusion of all groups in public institutions. It is necessary to increase the representation of vulnerable groups, to speak openly about problems, to create a pluralistic society. In authoritarian states, especially when security forces are responsible for preventing and countering violent extremism, such methods are not central.”

“It is a pity that hijabi girls in the education system are treated as if they are terrorists,” said Malika expressing her frustration. “If I did not have to, I would not even go to the doorsteps of a school. We once dreamed of working at public schools, but now we just hate it. Working in a place where freedom and justice is not present is like humiliating yourself and your knowledge!”

Winter has come early in Tajikistan, with the national power company, Barqi Tojik, notifying customers on September 21 that season rationing of electricity would begin the following day “where necessary” – a month earlier than usual.

Tajik media outlet Asia-Plus reported that although Barqi Tojik did not specify what was meant by “where necessary,” rural populations had been receiving electricity for 8-10 hours per day, split into two periods in the morning and evening, since September 21. 

The Barqi Tojik statement noted that a seasonal electricity shortage of more than 1 billion kilowatt-hours is anticipated, based on low water levels in the Vakhsh River. “Year after year, the increase in the demand of the population and social and economic sectors of the country causes a seasonal shortage of electricity,” the statement said.

Barqi Tojik urged the Tajik people to prepare for winter and “use electricity sparingly in the autumn and winter season.”

Energy is a critical topic for Dushanbe, and a long-time bane. Unlike Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (and to a lesser degree Uzbekistan), Tajikistan does not have significant gas or oil reserves.

A 2013 World Bank report on “Tajikistan’s Winter Energy Crisis” might as well have been written last year:

Tajikistan’s electricity system is in a state of crisis. Approximately 70 percent of the Tajik people suffer from extensive shortages of electricity during the winter… The winter electricity shortages are caused by a combination of low hydropower output during winter when river flows are low and high demand driven by heating needs.

The study, notably, did not include the Rogun hydropower project given that “such large and complex hydropower projects, even if they are deemed technically and economically feasible, are subject to long periods of preparation and delays…” Indeed, when construction on Rogun finally began in 2016, it was nearly 40 years after the project had first been launched. In 2018, operations began at Rogun, with 75 of its intended 335 meters built and a single turbine switched on. As of 2024, only two turbines are operational, with a third anticipated to be commissioned in 2025 and all six by 2029.

The Tajik government has poured billions into the Rogun project, but its potential to aid in addressing winter energy shortages is limited. The 2013 World Bank reported noted that hydropower systems have diminished capacity during the winter “due to low river flows.” With climate change exacerbating the highs and the lows, this will continue to be a concern.

The resurrection of energy interdependence in Central Asia, made possibly by Tajikistan’s stated aim to reconnect with the Central Asian Integrated Power System (IPS or CAPS), may alleviate the situation if the diplomacy can get the flows right. The region’s power grids were set up during the Soviet era so that hydropower-rich Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could provide electricity to gas- and oil-rich Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which in turn could help power the mountainous regions during winter water lows. With independence after 1991, the system started to break down as each country pursued the dream of self-sufficiency.

Tajikistan has stated that it will rejoin the unified grid in May 2025, but cautious optimism is warranted. In 2018 the Asian Development Bank approved a $35 million grant to help Tajikistan reconnect to the Central Asian grid by 2022; it’s not clear what happened to that project, but Dushanbe was not plugged back in by 2022.

Tajik officials often urge citizens to be mindful of their electricity usage. For example, as reported by Asia-Plus, Barki Tojik press secretary Nozir Yodgori claimed that “the most correct way that can reduce the seasonal shortage of electricity is careful, economical consumption of electricity by the population.”

However, TALCO – the Tajik Aluminum Company – is the country’s largest industrial enterprise and correspondingly its largest electricity consumer, using an estimated 25 to 40 percent of the country’s electricity. A March 2024, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) energy policy brief regarding Tajikistan noted, “An audit revealed a potential energy saving of over 20% [at TALCO], but subsidized tariffs have discouraged investment in energy efficiency.” That audit was conducted in 2012 – it’s not clear that any such efficiency improvements or subsidy adjustments have been made.

As both the audit and the World Bank reported cite above suggest, there is a need for updated reviews of Tajikistan’s energy system and policies. It’s clear from the worsening conditions that whatever has been done isn’t enough.