The China-U.S. tensions over Taiwan are not new, but recent events have cast a harsher light on the fragility of the situation. Despite attempts at dialogue, like National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s visit to Beijing in late August, the Chinese government’s reaction to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has been swift and severe. 

On September 18, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed sanctions on nine U.S. defense companies over a $228 million arms sale, announced by the U.S. State Department on September 16, that involved the return, repair, and reshipment of spare parts for Taiwan. The announcement came just before a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon transited the Taiwan Strait on September 17. 

In response, China’s Ministry of Defense doubled down on September 20, warning both Taiwan and the United States that U.S.-made weapons would not safeguard Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but would instead directly lead to “self-destruction” – a stark reminder of the increasing hostility and rhetoric surrounding Taiwan’s defense.

The September 16 announcement marks the 16th arms sale to Taiwan under the Biden administration, yet doubts continue to mount over the United States’ true commitment to Taiwan’s security. The Biden administration’s sales have primarily consisted of munitions and sustainment packages delivered in small tranches, failing to address Taiwan’s need for a comprehensive modernization of its military, especially in comparison to China’s rapid space of military modernization.

According to Rupert Hammond-Chambers, the president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, the Biden administration appears to be avoiding more substantial military commitments to Taiwan, reminiscent of pre-Trump era policies that capped the value of arms sales to avoid provoking Beijing. In a press release, Hammond-Chambers warned that “U.S. support for Taiwan’s material force modernization has been waning since 2021. It now sits at its lowest point since 2001, bar the Obama Administration’s 4+ year arms sales freeze from 2011-2015, and it is continuing to fall.”

Recent arms deliveries have also been fraught with problems. A $345 million arms package delivered between November 2023 and March 2024 included unserviceable and expired equipment, some of which was found to be mildewed and water-damaged, according to a report published on September 11 by the Inspector General Office of the U.S. Department of Defense. These revelations undermine the credibility of U.S. commitments to Taiwan and raise serious questions about the effectiveness of these sales in enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

More advanced and lethal systems, such as F-16Vs, have faced significant delays, adding to a backlog of $20 billion in undelivered military hardware. U.S. officials have attributed these delays to the urgent demands of the war in Ukraine, suggesting that Washington’s priorities lie elsewhere, particularly in Europe, rather than in the Indo-Pacific region. This prioritization was further underscored by the urgent redeployment of the USS Lincoln from the West Pacific to the Arabian Sea in early August, leaving a significant gap in aircraft carrier presence in the region that remains unfilled.

The restrained and fragmented nature of U.S. arms supplies to Taiwan sends mixed signals at a time when Beijing’s military posture is increasingly aggressive. China’s Ministry of Defense has pledged that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to intensify its military training and preparations, and will take decisive measures to thwart any attempts at “Taiwan independence” or external interference. China’s actions are not merely rhetorical; they underscore a clear strategy to pressure Taiwan and the United States by both escalating military readiness and undermining the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to Taiwan.

Meanwhile, China appears to be taking calculated steps to marginalize the Taiwan issue in its broader strategic relationship with the U.S., particularly during the sensitive U.S. presidential election cycle. With polls showing a close race between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, Beijing has publicly maintained a non-interventionist stance, framing the U.S. election as a domestic affair. However, behind the scenes, China is hedging its bets, preparing to navigate both potential outcomes. In the event of a Trump victory, Beijing appears ready to endure economic sacrifices in exchange for strategic leverage, anticipating a transactional approach from a second Trump administration regarding Taiwan. 

Conversely, Beijing is also exploring opportunities to proactively build diplomatic consensus with Harris, should she win, possibly through side discussions with President Joe Biden at the upcoming APEC and G-20 summits in South America this November. Given Harris’ inexperience on foreign policy, China will be aiming to influence her potential administration. 

Meanwhile, Beijing is believed to continue strengthening military and political alignment with Russia, thereby complicating U.S. and allied presence in the Western Pacific, and bringing in a Russian factor into potential Taiwan contingency that has been repeatedly mentioned by the United States and Japan in particular. This strategic positioning serves China’s broader goal of diminishing U.S. influence in the region and enhancing its own sphere of control.

The consequences of this restrained U.S. approach are stark. Taiwan finds itself in a security dilemma, relying on a defense partner whose commitment appears inconsistent, while facing a China that is more emboldened than ever. This imbalance heightens the risk of miscalculations and unintended confrontations in the Taiwan Strait, with potential implications that stretch far beyond the immediate region. 

As the United States continues to navigate its broader geopolitical priorities, Taiwan remains caught in a perilous position, where the gaps in its defense capabilities are increasingly visible. The situation illustrates the broader challenges of managing great power competition in a multipolar world where the stakes are high and the margins for error are dangerously thin. The ongoing tensions are not just a test of military resolve but also of strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, setting the stage for a potentially transformative period in regional security dynamics.

Don’t underestimate the value of updates for your browser and for Windows itself either. A significant number of malware packages exploit older software, which is why Microsoft and the browser makers are continually issuing updates to plug holes and patch up vulnerabilities. If you’re running the latest version of Windows and the latest version of your browser, that’s another line of defense.

Antivirus software typically adds several elements to the mix, though it varies between packages: You might get a VPN included, for example, as well as parental controls, a password manager, and some secure cloud storage for your files. There are also often monitoring tools to look out for data hacks and leaks that might include your personal information (from credit card numbers to login details).

Dedicated antivirus programs will often be more proactive than Windows’ own solution, scanning incoming data as it arrives on the network and looking out for connected devices—like smart home gadgets—that may not have comprehensive privacy and security protections of their own. As the built-in Windows antivirus tool has improved, these third-party options have evolved to offer more and more functionality.

Do You Need an Antivirus Program?

Antivirus packages cover multiple devices with multiple features.

Courtesy of Norton

There’s no simple yes or no answer as to whether you need an antivirus program on Windows. It’s your choice, and if you want to go without one, then you do so at your own risk. The products offered by the big names in the business like Bitdefender and Norton are certainly effective and reliable when it comes to keeping malicious code away from your Windows system.

At the same time, an up-to-date version of Windows, plus Windows Security, plus a current web browser, is a pretty robust setup for most users—and one that a lot of viruses and other malware are going to struggle to get through. Your online activities affect your level of safety too: Spend a lot of time watching and downloading pirated content, for example, and your risk level goes up.

It’s a bit like driving in some ways. Observe the speed limits, keep your eyes on the road, follow the signs, stick to the parts of town you’re most familiar with, and you’re going to stay out of trouble most of the time—but you’re going to be even safer in an armored car and with a police escort.

It’s worth noting that neither setup is 100 percent guaranteed to keep you safe all of the time. Also, it’s ironic, but sometimes installing an antivirus program comes with its own security risks.

What’s certainly true is that an antivirus program is no longer a must-have on a modern Windows system. It’s also no longer the first app you have to install. These antivirus packages are now optional extras, giving you some extra peace of mind and additional features that you might consider valuable for your setup.

Capture the flag hacking contests at security conferences generally serve two purposes: to help participants develop and demonstrate computer hacking and security skills, and to assist employers and government agencies with discovering and recruiting new talent.

But one security conference in China may have taken its contest a step further—potentially using it as a secret espionage operation to get participants to collect intelligence from an unknown target.

According to two Western researchers who translated documentation for China’s Zhujian Cup, also known as the National Collegiate Cybersecurity Attack and Defense Competition, one part of the three-part competition, held last year for the first time, had a number of unusual characteristics that suggest its potentially secretive and unorthodox purpose.

Capture the flag (CTF) and other types of hacking competitions are generally hosted on closed networks or “cyber ranges”—dedicated infrastructure set up for the contest so that participants don’t risk disrupting real networks. These ranges provide a simulated environment that mimics real-world configurations, and participants are tasked with finding vulnerabilities in the systems, obtaining access to specific parts of the network, or capturing data.

There are two major companies in China that set up cyber ranges for competitions. The majority of the competitions give a shout out to the company that designed their range. Notably, Zhujian Cup didn’t mention any cyber range or cyber range provider in its documentation, leaving the researchers to wonder if this is because the contest was held in a real environment rather than a simulated one.

The competition also required students to sign a document agreeing to several unusual terms. They were prohibited from discussing the nature of the tasks they were asked to do in the competition with anyone; they had to agree not to destroy or disrupt the targeted system; and at the end of the competition, they had to delete any backdoors they planted on the system and any data they acquired from it. And unlike other competitions in China the researchers examined, participants in this portion of the Zhujian Cup were prohibited from publishing social media posts revealing the nature of the competition or the tasks they performed as part of it.

Participants also were prohibited from copying any data, documents, or printed materials that were part of the competition; disclosing information about vulnerabilities they found; or exploiting those vulnerabilities for personal purposes. If a leak of any of this data or material occurred and caused harm to the contest organizers or to China, according to the pledge that participants signed, they could be held legally responsible.

“I promise that if any information disclosure incident (or case) occurs due to personal reasons, causing loss or harm to the organizer and the country, I, as an individual, will bear legal responsibility in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations,” the pledge states.

The contest was hosted last December by Northwestern Polytechnical University, a science and engineering university in Xi’an, Shaanxi, that is affiliated with China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and also holds a top-secret clearance to conduct work for the Chinese government and military. The university is overseen by China’s People’s Liberation Army.