The intense military confrontation between Iran and Israel, sparked by the assassination of key Hezbollah and Hamas leaders and followed by Tehran’s large-scale missile strikes on Tel Aviv, has led to a notable increase in anti-Shia and anti-Jewish propaganda efforts by the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP).

ISKP’s Uzbek and Tajik wings are exploiting the Iranian-Israeli military escalation to recruit, raise funds, and incite violence. Amid Israel’s devastating war with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” forces, the Islamic States’ Khorasan branch has launched a propaganda offensive targeting both Iran and Israel, branding them as “enemies of the Islamic Ummah, equally dangerous to the Ahlus Sunnah (Sunni Islam).”

Shortly after Hamas’ October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks and the subsequent destructive Israeli invasion of Gaza, ISKP’s official multilingual propaganda arm, Al-Azaim Media Foundation, initiated a media campaign targeting Iran and Israel through its English-language magazine, Voice of Khurasan (Issue 35), under the headline “Sibling Quarrel.” The editorial expressed satisfaction, noting how two sworn enemies of Islam were destroying each other in the Middle East.

The article spins an elaborate conspiracy theory, contending that despite the depiction of the Iran-Israel conflict, Shias are historically descended from Jewish Sabaeans, and both groups actively undermine the Islamic Ummah by opposing the true faith of Allah. It further claims that the “enmity” between Iran and Israel is a contrived narrative, sustained by “orchestrated, mutually coordinated missile strikes” intended to foster the illusion of a protracted conflict. Additionally, it argues that Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” has done nothing to advance the freedom of Palestinian Muslims but has instead corrupted both their religion and society.

ISKP’s propaganda asserts that Israel aims to establish a Jewish state from the Nile to the Euphrates, while Iran aspires to form a Shia crescent extending from Tripoli to Mecca, unified in its hostility toward Sunni Muslims. The publication further insists that only the Islamic State can thwart the dangerous schemes of both Israel and Iran, purging the Middle East of Jews and Shias.

Following the publication of Voice of Khurasan, the Tajik and Uzbek media wings of ISKP’s Al-Azaim Media Foundation, specifically al-Azaim Tajiki and al-Azaim Uzbeki, initiated a propaganda campaign directed against both Iran and Israel. A pro-IS Tajik Telegram channel, Sadoi Khuroson, stated that “Rawafidhs [a derogatory term for Shia Muslims] are the donkeys of the Jews,” employing profoundly offensive language.

Weaponizing Sectarian Hatred: ISKP’s Anti-Shia and Anti-Semitic Ideology

Notably, ISKP propaganda frequently targets both Shias and Jews simultaneously, reflecting the group’s broader ideological goals. Violent anti-Shiism and antisemitism are core principles of the hardline Salafi ideology embraced by the Uzbek and Tajik wings of ISKP.

Before the emergence of ISKP in Afghanistan in late 2014, al-Qaida-linked Central Asian jihadi organizations espoused a less severe form of anti-Shia and antisemitic ideology and did not perceive Iran and Israel in a unified context. But over the past decade, local ISKP ideologues have effectively transformed their Central Asian militants, Tajiks in particular – who share deep cultural, linguistic, and historical ties with the Persians of Iran – into fervent anti-Shia and anti-Jewish Salafi jihadists. Today, vitriolic rhetoric against Jews and Shia Muslims dominates publications such as Xuroson Ovozi, Sadoi Khuroson, and Khurasan Ghag magazines, as well as the al-Azaim Tajiki and al-Azaim Uzbeki Telegram channels. 

Despite the apparent enmity between Iran and Israel, the Uzbek and Tajik wings of ISKP nevertheless perceive Jews and Shias as allies. Their anti-Shiism is deeply intertwined with the group’s antisemitism within the framework of Central Asian Salafism. After October 7 conspiracy theories have gained traction within Central Asian Salafi circles accusing Shias of acting as agents of the Jews in a coordinated effort to undermine Sunni Islam. 

In addition to its goal of liberating the sacred lands of Bayt ul Maqdis (Jerusalem) and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, one of Islam’s three holiest sites, anti-Shia and anti-Semitic ideology has now become a core element of ISKP Tajik and Uzbek unit’s media strategy.

In line with directives from its parent organization, pro-ISKP Telegram channels in Cyrillic, operated by Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik jihadi propagandists, often claim that “the Jews and the Rawafidh are two sides of the same coin.” These platforms exploit the global Jewish-Shia conspiracy narrative to boost recruitment, fundraise, incite violence, and expand ISKP’s ideological reach throughout the post-Soviet Central Asian region.

Anti-Shia Doctrine Propelled Tajik ISKP to Strike Iran

Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, ISKP’s hardline anti-Shia and antisemitic ideology has undeniably played a pivotal role in expanding its propaganda reach and internationalizing its operational agenda. The group has relentlessly criticized the Taliban – its chief adversary – accusing them of deviating from religious purity, colluding with Shia Iran, and aligning with U.S. interests, thereby reinforcing its narrative as the sole legitimate defender of the faith of Allah.

Over the past three years, ISKP has evolved from a provincial branch of the Islamic State, focused primarily on fighting the local Taliban regime, into one of the world’s most notorious and dangerous terrorist organizations. This shift toward regionalization and internationalization has been propelled largely by post-Soviet Tajik and Uzbek militants, who orchestrated high-profile attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia between 2022 and 2024.

Since 2021, ISKP has successfully formed a Shaheed (martyrdom) unit comprised of Tajik fighters, specifically tasked with targeting Iranian Shias. These militants are celebrated as exemplars of bravery, devotion, and self-sacrifice in the quest for the Islamic Caliphate. Driven by a potent blend of anti-Shiism and antisemitic ideology, ISKP’s Tajik fighters have elevated the group’s external operations to new global heights, significantly broadening its transnational reach and influence.

The first external operation conducted by ISKP’s Tajik wing – extending beyond its traditional areas of operation in Central Asia and Afghanistan – took place on October 26, 2022, in Iran’s southwestern Fars province. In this attack, a Tajik militant opened fire at the Shah Cheragh shrine in Shiraz, resulting in at least 15 fatalities and over 40 injuries. Shortly after, ISKP claimed responsibility through its Amaq News Agency, stating that the purpose of the attack was to “remind the Rawafidh that the companions of the Prophet Muhammad have descendants who inherit revenge generation after generation.” Amaq also referenced its 2018 attack during a military parade in Ahvaz Province as further evidence of its continued commitment to avenging the Shia. 

A few days later, Islamic State’s Al-Naba (#363) published a photo and video of a Tajik fighter, codenamed Abu Aisha al-Omari, holding a rifle in front of an Islamic State flag, pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence identified the shooter as Subhan Kamroni, also known by his alias as Abu Aisha, a citizen of Tajikistan. The ministry further reported the arrest of 26 Islamic State Takfiri militants, all foreign nationals from Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan. 

The second high-profile external operation by ISKP’s Tajik wing, which garnered significant international attention and caused extensive casualties, occurred on January 3, 2024. A twin bombing targeted a gathering of Iranians commemorating former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, at his grave in Kerman, Iran. The devastating attack claimed 96 lives and injured 284 others. The Islamic State, through its Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility, releasing a video of two Tajik fighters pledging allegiance to Islamic State leader Sheikh Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi before carrying out the operation.

Following the attack, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, through the state-run Tasnim News agency, identified the two ISKP Tajik suicide bombers as Abdollah al-Tajiki and Israeli Bazirov, a 24-year-old Tajikistani citizen. The ministry disclosed that Bazirov, who had undergone jihadi training at an ISKP camp in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, had illegally entered Iran through a smuggler’s route in the Sistan and Baluchistan province.

ISKP’s Tajik wing attracted further international attention following its highly coordinated attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow on March 22, 2024. Executed by four Tajik militants, this operation marked the wing’s third and most significant external attack to date.

The appeal of ISKP for Tajik and Uzbek recruits lies in its compelling ideological doctrine and sophisticated propaganda strategy, which have successfully targeted the most vulnerable and disillusioned segments of Central Asian society, often unemployed and impoverished youth. In their desperation, many find solace and direction in radical Salafism.

Amid Israel’s devastating military campaigns in Gaza and southern Lebanon, which have resulted in significant civilian casualties, ISKP’s multilingual Al-Azaim Media Foundation continues to amplify and weaponize its hardline anti-Shia and anti-Jewish ideology for strategic gain. Voice of Khorasan, Al-Naba, and pro-ISKP Tajik, Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek Telegram channels are all filled with sectarian hostility and inflammatory dawahs from prominent Salafi imams, targeting both Israel and Iran under a unified ideological framework.

The headlines from ISKP’s Voice of Khorasan articles, such as “Message to Our Brothers and Sisters in Palestine: Join the Caravan of Izzah” (issue #33), “Why IS Mujahideen Target Rawafidh and Turn Their Cities into Cemeteries” (issue #38), “Sufyani’s Army is Gathering” (issue #38), “Palestine: The New War on Tyrants Has Begun” (issue #32), and “Reality of Rawafidh” (issue #32), along with their Dari-language book “The Rawafidh and Bait al-Maqdis,” reveal the group’s strategic exploitation of the Israel-Hezbollah-Hamas conflict to advance its jihadi goals. These publications blend anti-Shia and antisemitic ideologies, promoting conspiracy theories that depict Shia Muslims as long-standing allies of Jews in a unified campaign to annihilate Sunni Islam.

ISKP: A Terrorism Threat to the West

ISKP’s sophisticated anti-Shia and antisemitic ideology is strategically crafted to expand the scale of both local and global attacks, while also inciting lone-wolf terrorists in Europe and the United States to commit high-profile acts of violence. The recent arrests of ISKP sympathizers – including a Tajik national in Italy and Uzbek and Tajik migrants in Russia, Germany, and Turkey – underscore the influence of its calls for attacks against the “Crusaders,” Jews, and Shias.

ISKP Tajik and Uzbek wings’ ability to exploit the suffering in Gaza raises the real possibility that Central Asian migrants in the West could become radicalized by its ideological messaging. The prominence of the Palestinian conflict further amplifies the risk of lone-wolf attacks inspired by ISKP. This makes vigilance by Western counterterrorism and intelligence agencies critical.

An Afghan citizen living in Oklahoma has been arrested and charged with conspiring to conduct an Election Day attack on behalf of the Islamic State, according to  the U.S. Department of Justice.

Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi, 27, was arrested on October 7, along with a co-conspirator, while procuring two AK-47 assault rifles, ten magazines, and 500 rounds of ammunition from an FBI asset in western Oklahoma. 

Tawhedi, per the criminal complaint that was unsealed on October 8, entered the United States on September 9, 2021 on a special immigrant visa (SIV) and was awaiting the adjudication of his immigration status. Tawhedi’s co-conspirator, who has not been named since he is a minor, is also an Afghan citizen but a legal permanent resident, having entered the U.S. in March 2018 on an SIV.

The SIV program was established in 2009 to resettle Afghans who had worked on behalf of the United States in Afghanistan. It witnessed a surge in interest and attention following the end of the U.S. war in Afghanistan and collapse of the erstwhile Republic government in August 2021. The number of visas is subject to a congressionally set cap and the process is lengthy. According to a September 2023 State Department report referenced by Reuters earlier this year, “some 130,000 full or partial applications were awaiting processing.”

Tawhedi has been charged with conspiring and attempting to provide material support to the Islamic State, which carries a maximum prison sentence of 20 years, and receiving a firearm to be used to commit a felony or a federal crime of terrorism, which carries a maximum prison sentence of 15 years, if convicted.

The criminal complaint lays out evidence of Tawhedi’s Islamic State sympathies, including a July 2024 video of him reading to two children – his daughter and his co-conspirator’s younger brother – a text that “describes the rewards a martyr receives in the afterlife.” Tawhedi’s Google records allegedly demonstrate that he viewed and saved Islamic State propaganda. The Justice Department also alleges in the complaint that Tawhedi contributed to charities believed to be fronts for the Islamic State.

The connection between Tawhedi and the Islamic State appears to be through an individual known under the alias Abdul Malik. “In a prior investigation, FBI determined that Malik had facilitated recruitment, training and indoctrination of persons who expressed interest in terrorist activity…” the Justice Department noted.

The alleged plot seems to have been born out of exchanges between Malik and Tawhedi, in which the latter communicated the steps he’d taken to sell his house and purchase one-way tickets for his family to return to Afghanistan.

A footnote worth highlighting appears on page 19 of the criminal complaint: “Based on all evidence available at this time, [co-conspirator 1]’s father has no knowledge of or involvement in [Tawhedi and co-conspirator 1]’s plans to acquire firearms and ammunition or the engage in an attack.”

Assuming the minor co-conspirator is 17 or younger means that he entered the United States at the age of 11 or younger – therefore he arrived as the dependent of an Afghan who had worked with the United States, presumably his father. 

In the heated political environment of the United States, often awash in blatant anti-immigrant sentiments, this case threatens to further ostracize an already vulnerable community.

“While the charges are serious, it’s critical that we do not assign blame to an entire community for the actions of one individual,” Shawn VanDiver, the president and board chairman of #AfghanEvac said in a statement. “Thousands of Afghans who resettled in the United States are working to build new lives and contribute to our shared future. These are the same individuals who stood shoulder to shoulder with us in Afghanistan for over two decades, defending the values we hold dear. Now, they are our neighbors, and we must support them as they seek safety and stability in their new home.”

#AfghanEvac administers a coalition of organizations “focused on deconflicting communications, effort, and systemic issues across the full enterprise of efforts focused on helping Afghans evacuate and resettle safely, swiftly, and within the bounds of the law.”

In light of these charges, VanDiver urged the public and media “to approach this story with the full context and a commitment to fairness.”

The criminal complaint provides considerable details about the alleged plot and evidence of Tawhedi’s aims – he reportedly said in an interview after his arrest that he planned to repatriate his family to Afghanistan, where they “could live according to pure Islam,” and then to commit an attack on Election Day targeting large gatherings in the United States. The complaint states that Tawhedi and his co-conspirator “expected to be martyred (i.e. die during the attack).”

What the complaint does not outline is Tawhedi’s path to radicalization, or that of his juvenile co-conspirator. At what point did they begin to sympathize with the Islamic State? What signs were missed or ignored? What interventions, if any, could have altered their trajectory? This may not be important to the criminal proceedings, but it is for understanding the context of this incident.

And this incident is sure to have widespread impact on the larger Afghan diaspora, both the thousands of Afghans already resettled in the United States and the many who remain abroad and in limbo as visas process through the bureaucracy.