Imagine stepping into your nation’s parliament building – a symbol of democracy, sovereignty, and national pride – only to discover it was designed, built, and is still maintained by a foreign government. This isn’t a fictional scenario; it’s the reality in countries like Malawi, where China constructed the parliament building and continues to hold the keys to its upkeep. Over the past two decades, China has financed and built at least 15 parliament buildings, including those in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and even the headquarters of the African Union in Ethiopia. While these projects are often presented as generous gestures that help to foster development, they carry hidden costs that extend far beyond their initial construction.
These buildings are more than physical structures; they are the epicenters of democratic governance and symbols of national identity. When a foreign power controls the spaces where laws are made and national debates are held, it raises critical questions about sovereignty and self-determination. In Malawi’s case, the parliament building suffers from numerous defects – leaking roofs, peeling tiles, and faulty plumbing – yet remains dependent on Chinese contractors for repairs and maintenance, perpetuating a cycle of reliance and ensuring a constant foreign presence at the heart of its democracy.
This dynamic is not just about bricks and mortar; it also stretches to digital encroachment. As nations strive to modernize, the infrastructure that supports their legislatures is increasingly digital. These Chinese government-financed African parliament buildings come fully equipped with mainstream digital infrastructure.
Fieldwork by Dr. Innocent Batsani-Ncube, one of the authors of this article, revealed that in Malawi, a Chinese contractor installed the local area network and the closed-circuit television, with network diagrams supplied in Chinese. This left the digital operations of the Parliament of Malawi dependent on continued Chinese technical support. Malawi is unable to replace this network infrastructure without consent from the Chinese government, which it has not granted.
Without proactive efforts to build and control their own digital public infrastructure, more countries may find themselves dependent on external powers’ “infrastructure diplomacy” for the technological frameworks that underpin their democratic institutions.
Legislatures are where the people engage with their government. They are essential for the functioning of democratic systems, yet the tools and applications that could modernize these institutions are not currently included in international discussions of and support for “Digital Public Infrastructure,” or DPI. These internationally supported digital systems have instead focused narrowly on applications in finance, healthcare, and education. The omission of legislative technologies from DPI efforts leaves a significant vulnerability in the democratic fabric, especially in a rapidly digitizing world.
As technology accelerates, legislatures around face a “pacing problem” – the widening gap between the rapid advancement of technology and the slower pace at which legislative bodies adapt. Expanding the definition of DPI to include legislative technology would help legislatures function more effectively and improve transparency, facilitate better citizen engagement, and enhance the capacity of lawmakers to craft informed policies.
Developing democracies often face significant hurdles in financing and implementing technology for their legislatures. Without sufficient resources, they may become dependent on external support to modernize their parliaments. If philanthropic organizations and international agencies do not provide opportunities and funding for this public interest technology, these countries might have no choice but to accept the “gifts” of nations that wish to exercise greater influence.
This dependency could grant foreign entities unprecedented access to legislative processes and sensitive information, undermining democratic principles and infringing on national sovereignty. The very institutions meant to represent the people’s interests could become conduits for external agendas.
The lessons from Malawi’s parliament building are clear: relying on external powers for critical infrastructure can have profound consequences for sovereignty and democratic governance. In an increasingly digital world, it is imperative that developing democracies maintain control over their own digital public infrastructure, especially within their legislative bodies.
Global donors have a vital role to play in supporting democratic institutions through expanded DPI initiatives focused on legislative technology. Investing in legislative technology by funding the development and implementation of digital tools for lawmaking, governance, and public engagement is essential.
Promoting open-source solutions will ensure transparency and customization, while enhanced capacity building through training programs will equip legislators and staff with necessary skills. Fostering international collaboration to facilitate the sharing of best practices in legislative modernization is also crucial. Through these efforts, global donors can help ensure that developing democracies maintain sovereignty over their governance systems and build resilient, independent digital infrastructures for the future.
