Now that Israel has decimated the top leadership of Hezbollah and Hamas, a limited Israel–Iran War may come sooner than later. So far, Israel’s military operations were essentially against non-state actors having territorial advantages. However, Iran is a powerful military country with nuclear weapons. Modern wars are protracted and difficult to win as evident from the Russia–Ukraine War. Israel may have done its strategic calculations about the war, its regional spread and expected outcomes. It would not go the whole hog unless assured of a quick and decisive victory or at least decimation of Iran’s offensive capabilities. 

Israel and Iran are not adjacent geographical neighbours. The two countries are separated by vast territorial expanse shared by Jordan and Iraq. The shortest ground distance between Tel Aviv and Tehran is more than 1,900 km. The shortest ground distance between their respective border is again 9,00 km. Iran’s all vital nuclear and military installations lie deep inside its territory. Therefore, ground military offensive operations are not possible. Huge distance also mean that even air wars through fighter jets would not be possible since Jordon and Iraq would not allow their airspace to be used for third-party military operations. Both Israel and Iran have to fall back on intermediate range ballistic missiles and drones to fire salvos at each other. The intensity and frequency of these missile and drone attacks, therefore, would not be sustainable over long period. Therefore, unlike other theaters of war, this war would be limited in periodicity.  

The outcome of the incoming war could be influenced by the relative military strength of the two countries. The military website www.globalfire.com publishes an annual report on the military power ranking of countries. In the 2024 edition, Iran is placed at 14th position and Israel is placed at 17th position. According to this ranking, there is very little differential in the comprehensive military power (CMP) of the two countries and they enjoy relative parity with each other. Similar sentiments are also echoed by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that published the Annual Military Balance (2024 edition). 

However, formal reports can be misleading and may not reflect true picture. Several factors give a massive edge to Israel’s military power vis-à-vis Iran. First, Israel has one of the most robust domestic military industrial complex (MIC). The legacy of perpetual conflict with state and not-state actors in its vicinity has promoted a production culture that specialise in producing weapons meant for Middle East warfare atmospherics. Compulsory enlisting also ensures that the military entrepreneurs and businesspersons know what will work for Israel against its enemies. Perhaps that speaks why Israeli drones, satellites, surveillance weapons and missile defence systems have a huge global demand. Iran does not figure anywhere in any such discourses. 

Second, Israel’s defence budget, pegged at $27.5 billion in 2023 was at least 2.5 times that of Iran’s defence budget at $10.3 billion, as per Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This provides Israel considerable lead over Iran in arming itself with current generation weapons (such as F-35 fighter jets imported from the US). Iran, on the other hand, simply doesn’t have enough money to buy imported weapons. It presently ranks at the 135th position in the list of arms importing countries. Moreover, the long-standing global sanctions has taken a toll on Iran’s weapons ambitions. All it has a rag-tag, worn out collection of tanks and fighter jets. It was only last year when Iran could place a supply order for import of 24 fighter jets from Russia. 

Third, Israel has experimented and employed disruptive military innovation quite successfully as seen from intelligence-based precision attacks, bunker busting and pager-explosions. Due to compulsory military tenure policy, Israeli citizens have become a first-class warrior community. The relative success against Hamas and Hezbollah has engendered new confidence amongst Israelis and they would be eager to take political and military risks against Iran. On the contrary, Iran has not fought any serious war since late eighties. It may have larger mass in terms of recruits but they lack professional military education (PME) in information technology environment. Thus, they may not have what it takes to launch a front-end offensive or defensive military operation.  

Fourth, although the US has been critical of Israel’s relentless attack in Gaza leading to mass civilian casualties, it will find it difficult to remain a mute spectator in case the Israel – Iran conflict flares up. American positioning of aircraft carriers, military forces in the region and supplementing Israel’s missile defence system with its own would add to the Israeli military weight against Iran. At this stage, neither Russia nor China would may help Iran in any manner excerpt for some verbal-diplomatic gymnastics. The position might change only if President Trump comes to power who does not like financing others’ war.

It is perhaps possible to identify the tentative contours of Israel’s war objectives. Israel would not look for an outright victory since that would take a toll on its scarce air power and missile resources in a time-consuming operation. Israel’s war objectives would not extend beyond crippling Iran’s vital installations as well as its missile attack system so that the future threats are reduced. Probably, there is only one thing that may prevent Israel from an early offensive response – Iran’s nuclear capabilities that may take the war up the escalation ladder. Nevertheless, history is also witness to many instances when nuclear weapons were disdainfully treated as ‘paper tigers’. Israel may have deterrence strategy here also!  

Israel would certainly attack Iran to avenge the inconsequential drone attack that, nevertheless, exposed the famed ‘iron dome missile defence system’ over Israeli skies. Iran’s two proxies – Hamas and Hezbollah are on defensive mat. Israel would be looking nothing more than similar crippling of Iran’s offensive capabilities. Israel would perhaps clinch this, irrespective of Iran’s national resolve and resource marshalling. 

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